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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a Nearly Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) system for 
advanced reactors. The development process of NAMAC is characterized by a three layer-layer 
architecture: knowledge base, the Digital Twin (DT) developmental layer, and the NAMAC 
operational layer. The DT is described as a knowledge acquisition system from the knowledge 
base for intended uses in the NAMAC system. A set of DTs with different functions is developed 
with acceptable performance and assembled according to the NAMAC operational workflow to 
furnish recommendations to operators. To demonstrate the capability of the NAMAC system, a 
case study is designed, where a baseline NAMAC is implemented for operating a simulator of the 
Experimental Breeder Reactor II during a single loss of flow accident. When NAMAC is operated 
in the training domain, it can provide reasonable recommendations that prevent the peak fuel 
centerline temperature from exceeding a safety criterion. 
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1. Introduction 
 
With the advancement in computer performance, machine learning, and digital systems, interest 
in development of autonomous control systems has increased in a variety of fields from industrial 
manufacturing to unmanned space, ground vehicles, and nuclear reactors. Autonomous control 
systems are intelligent systems with self-governance ability to perform and execute control 
functions in the presence of uncertainty for an extended time [1]. The degree of autonomy of an 
autonomous control system depends upon the extent to which it can perform fault diagnosis, 
planning, forecasting, and decision-making under uncertainty, without human intervention [2].  
 
Owing to the inherent risk and uncertainty associated with the operation of nuclear reactor systems, 
the design of autonomous control systems is a challenging task. Over the past several years, 
different techniques have been adopted to develop functions related to autonomous control and 
operation of nuclear reactor systems. Upadhyaya et al. [3] [4] developed an autonomous control 
system for a space reactor system (Fast spectrum Lithium cooled reactor) with Model Predictive 
Control (MPC) using a Genetic Algorithm for optimization. Fault detection in this system is 
performed using Principal Component analysis. Cetiner et al. [5] developed a Supervisory Control 
System (SCS) that uses a probabilistic decision-making approach using fault tree and event tree in 
conjunction with deterministic assessment of plant state variables for autonomous control and 
maintenance of advanced small modular reactors. Groth et al. [6] [7] use dynamic Probabilistic 
Risk Analysis (PRA) for fault detection and management, and counterfactual reasoning for 
decision analysis in a Sodium fast reactor during earthquake-induced transients. This system is 
called the Safely Managing Accidental Reactor Transients (SMART) system. Lee et al. [8] 
developed an autonomous operation algorithm for core damage prevention (loss of coolant 
accident, Steam generator tube rupture) in a Pressurized Water Reactor. This work uses a Function-
based Hierarchical Framework (FHF) and an advanced Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithm like 
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) for plant state diagnosis and control. All the autonomous 
control systems discussed here perform diagnosis and decision-making for fault management and 
control. In the case of the SCS and SMART systems, a strategic decision analysis is performed 
based on the consequence of decision choices while in the case of the space reactor system and 
FHF, decision making is implicitly performed based on some preset decision preferences.  
 
In this study, a Nearly Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) system is designed to 
provide recommendations to the operator for maintaining the safety and performance of the 
reactor. The development of the NAMAC system is based on three elements: 
 
• Knowledge base – a class of databases, scenarios, and models to support the control and 
risk management of the reactor; 
• Digital Twin (DT) – a knowledge acquisition system to support different NAMAC 
functions (i.e., diagnosis, strategy planning, prognosis, strategy assessment, etc.); 
• Operational workflow – an assembly of DTs to support operator’s decision-making or to 
make direct operational recommendations. 
 
Comparing to the reviewed intelligent systems, NAMAC is a computerized safety case that aims 
to achieve an alignment of NPP safety design, analysis, operator training, and emergency 
management by furnishing recommendations to operators for effective actions that will achieve 
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particular goals, based on the NAMAC’s knowledge of the current plant state, prediction of the 
future state transients, and reflecting the uncertainties that complicate the determination of 
mitigating strategies. Such knowledge is extracted from the knowledge base by machine-learning 
algorithms and stored in DTs of various functions. Although this is not the first time machine 
learning algorithms or DTs are used in the autonomous control system, this is the first time that 
these tools are implemented and combined in a system with a structured workflow in order to 
promote rigor, comprehensiveness, and realism in safety cases. Moreover, NAMAC system 
recognizes the importance of explainability by deriving recommendation from an intelligible 
technical basis. This includes an argument-based operational workflow, operating procedures and 
reactor technical specifications in the knowledge base, and a modular NAMAC architecture with 
DTs of different autonomous functions. Key DTs in NAMAC include: 
 
• Diagnosis – Monitors safety significant factor(s) based on observed sensor data; 
• Strategy inventory – Identifies feasible control options based on plant state diagnosis, 
safety and control limits; 
• Prognosis – Forecasts plant state for each control option; 
• Strategy assessment – Ranks the control options based on the consequence and user defined 
preference structure related to safety, operability and/or performance of the reactor. 
 
To evaluate and demonstrate the capability of DTs and the NAMAC system, a case study is 
designed for the control of Experimental Breeder Reactor – II (EBR-II) during a single Loss Of 
Flow Accident (LOFA). To further evaluate the scalability and uncertainty of DTs and NAMAC, 
test cases are designed with different sources of uncertainty. For DTs tests, sources include input 
data, model fits, scope compliance, etc., while for NAMAC tests, accident scenarios lying outside 
the training domain are used. To avoid severe consequences due to NAMAC uncertainty, a global 
discrepancy checker is implemented to determine if the plant is moving towards the expected 
system state after the control actions are injected. If the discrepancy between expected and 
observed states exceed a limit, an anomaly is claimed, and the operator is alerted. Meanwhile, a 
safety-oriented control action, i.e. SCRAM, is recommended.  
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the concepts of three-layer 
hierarchical NAMAC development process, DT technology and its implementation in NAMAC, 
plant simulator model, data generation engine, and NAMAC operational workflow. Section 3 
presents a case study where NAMAC is controlling the simulator of EBR-II during a single LOFA 
based on DT implementations and operational workflows. Moreover, tests are performed to 
evaluate the uncertainty of DTs and NAMAC systems with different sources of uncertainty. 
Section 4 presents conclusions of this study. 
 
2. Nearly Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) System and Design  
 
This section describes the NAMAC architecture, the development of the DTs, and the construction 
of the knowledge base. The first part of this section illustrates the three-layer NAMAC 
architecture, including knowledge base, DT development process (for different NAMAC 
functions), and NAMAC operational workflow. The second part of this section illustrates the 
concept of DTs and how they are implemented in the NAMAC system. The third part of this 
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section describes the GOTHIC plant simulator and data generation engine. The fourth part of this 
section describes the NAMAC operational workflow based on the assembly of different DTs. 
 
2.1. NAMAC Architecture 
 
The development process of NAMAC can be demonstrated by the three-layer architecture (see 
Figure 1). The three layers are: (i) Knowledge base, (ii) NAMAC developmental layer, and (iii) 
NAMAC operational layer. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: NAMAC integral workflow 
 
The first layer focuses on development of the knowledge base. The knowledge base serves as the 
foundations to the whole scheme, and the upper layers store or make use of partial information 
from the knowledge base. The knowledge base for NAMAC development can be classified into 
three components: (i) issue space, (ii) simulation tool, and (iii) data repository. Issue space defines 
the scenario in mathematical formulations. The simulation tool (system code with adequate 
fidelity) is required for generating training/testing data set for the development of different DTs. 
In this work, we employ GOTHIC [9] for system level simulations and RAVEN [10] as the 
sampling tool. Data repository has two elements: knowledge element and data element. 
Knowledge element consists of literature or information related to operating procedures and 
training materials, system configuration, initial conditions, reactor failure modes, experimental 
data, benchmarking results, etc. Data element consists of data generated by the simulation tool for 
development of NAMAC DTs and plant data collected from operational histories, transients, and 
events.  
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The second layer focuses on the development and implementation (training and testing) of 
NAMAC DTs. These DTs can be treated as surrogate models for specific sets of information and 
knowledge from the knowledge base. For example, Digital Twin for Diagnosis (DT-D) aims to 
monitor the unmeasurable and unobservable state variables by storing correlation and 
dependencies among different state variables; Digital Twin for Prognosis (DT-P) is used to predict 
the short-term transient and the consequences of control actions by storing the time-propagation 
of state variables with respect to reference information, including initial conditions, control 
actions, histories, etc. More details about DTs training and testing are discussed in section 2.2.  
 
Once DTs are implemented, they are fed to the third layer and assembled based on the operational 
workflow. Since NAMAC aims to support operators’ decision-making by making 
recommendations, a logic scheme is needed to support the final recommendation based on real-
time observations and records by DTs. For example, NAMAC needs to figure out the complete 
states of the reactor by monitoring the unobservable state variables with DT-D; NAMAC also 
needs to understand the consequences of control actions by predicting the short-term transient of 
state variables with DT-P. More details about the design and implementation of NAMAC 
operational workflow is discussed in section 2.5. The operational layer also aims to test the 
performance of NAMAC by coupling the system with a nuclear reactor or a plant simulator.  
 
The NAMAC structure discussed here is highly modular. We believe that this has important 
advantages in scalability and interpretability, which will become more important when a much 
broader issue space is considered. Moreover, the modular architecture allows for a plug-and-play 
character such that NAMAC can be more adaptive to different reactor designs, instrument and 
control system, hardware platform, etc.  
 
To avoid major failures during DT training and NAMAC operations, discrepancy checkers are 
incorporated between layers. The discrepancy checker between development and operational 
layers aims to determine if the DT has satisfied the acceptance criteria with respect to accuracy 
and coverage, where coverage is defined based on the comparison between training and application 
scenarios. The discrepancy checker in operational layer aims to continuously monitor the reactor 
states and to compare them against those from DTs and NAMAC. If the observed states largely 
deviate from DTs’ output, it is suggested that the DT outputs and NAMAC recommendations are 
not trustworthy either because they are operated outside the training domain or their accuracy are 
not high enough in the developmental stage. To avoid the situation where NAMAC overlooks the 
failure conditions due to inherent errors, the operator will be alerted and suggested to take safety-
minded control actions, i.e. SCRAM, when the discrepancy is larger than a criterion. It is stressed 
that NAMAC does not necessarily intend to replace traditional control and management 
guidelines, although this might be an option for microreactors operating remotely. NAMAC talks 
to the operators about what is likely to work best; it is intended to be useful whenever operators 
are required to monitor numerous and diverse systems in order to take the proper action. 
 
Other architectures, including FHF and supervisory control architecture, can be found in works 
by Lee et al. [8] and Cetiner et al. [11]. FHF decomposes the control of complex reactor system 
into three levels: the goal, function, and system levels. The FHF starts at the conceptual level 
with Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety goals that must be achieved by the autonomous system to 
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ensure the reactor and public safety, for example, to prevent core damage and the release of 
radiation, to mitigate the consequences of accidents, etc. The function level includes functions 
that are designed to achieve the goal, including reactivity control, containment integrity, reactor 
coolant system, etc. The system level identifies the system, components, and input/output 
parameters of control systems that are designed to satisfy the safety functions. The supervisory 
control architecture also has goal-function-system structure, but it further decomposes the 
function level, into decision, prognostic, and diagnostic sub-levels. The objective is to achieve 
complete and accurate understanding in the reactor interval states with a successive delegation of 
duties. For example, the decision-makings depends on prognostic estimation of remaining 
service lift of key components, which further depends on the diagnostics of components’ 
conditions. In NAMAC, the three-layer structure is a natural extension to the Data-Information-
Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) pyramid, which is usually treated as a computational 
representation of intelligence system [12]. Such an architecture is claimed to be able to 
maximally ensure system adaptability when complexity grows [13].  
 
2.2. Digital Twins 
 
This section is divided into five parts. The first part defines DT technology based on the available 
materials. The second and third parts illustrate the requirement and design of DTs with data-driven 
methods. The fourth part introduces one of the data-driven modeling techniques, feedforward 
neural network, for developing different DTs. The fifth part illustrates the phases of DT 
development based on their maturity with respect to reactor application. It is stressed that the 
current development is at a scoping stage, where the major objectives are to learn from experience 
and to mature the framework. It is argued that the general applicability of DT definition and the 
supreme expressive power of neural networks make DT technology by ML algorithms largely 
applicable to different system designs. 
 
2.2.1. Digital Twin Technology 
 
A DT is a digital representation of a physical object or system that relies on real-time and past-
history data to evaluate its complete states, to predict future transients, and to recommend 
appropriate control actions. During the operation of a NPP, DTs can help the operator to sustain 
an accurate understanding of the physical system, improve the effectiveness of control, and avoid 
human errors. Considering the complexity of physical systems like nuclear reactors, the 
implementation of DTs requires diverse technologies, including modeling and simulation, data 
analytics, AI, etc. To guide the development of DTs, Kahlen et al. [14] define DT based on three 
attributes: digital twin prototype (DTP), digital twin instance (DTI), and digital twin environment 
(DTE).  
 
The DTE represents the application space for operating the DTs, and it can be further classified 
into predictive and interrogative DTEs. The predictive DT, sometimes known as prognosis DT, is 
used for predicting future behavior, and the predictive performance starts from the current point in 
the product’s lifecycle at its current state, and moves forward in time. The interrogative DT, also 
known as diagnosis DT, is used to interrogate the current and past histories of certain objects or 
systems.  
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The DTP contains models and tools necessary to describe and produce a virtual version that 
duplicates or twins the physical version. Generally, there are three classes of options: model-free 
methods, model-based methods, and reasoning-based methods. The parameters of a model-based 
method have a physical or qualitative meaning, and the number of parameters is usually fixed. 
Classical model-based methods for diagnosis include parity equations, diagnostic observer, 
Kalman filters, and parameter estimation. For model-free methods, the parameters represent the 
joint distribution or statistical hypotheses concerning the behavior of observed random variables 
[15]. Calibrations are needed to estimate these parameters based on experimental measurements 
or databases, and they can be sampled from probability distributions. Reasoning-based models are 
usually implemented by if-then-rules, and tools include Answer Set Programming, Fuzzy Logics, 
Bayesian networks, Prolog, etc. They have been successfully used mainly in interrogative DTEs.  
 
DTI refers to a specific instance of an individual DT that is directly linked to a physical object or 
system. In applications, DTI usually refers to the scenarios, I/O, and user interfaces of DTs. It is 
stressed that compared to DTP, the DTI contains more details since the DTP is designed to reflect 
multiple or a sequence of instances. Meanwhile, the DTI needs to be more specific such that it can 
be clearly defined for a specific scenario, initial/boundary condition, time point, user interface, etc.  
  
In this study, the DTE is limited to applications of system controls for advanced NPPs and referred 
to as DT functions. To be specific, the interrogative (diagnosis) DTE is used to monitor state 
variables that are safety significant to the System Thermal-Hydraulics (STH) in the primary loop 
of an advanced reactor, while the predictive (prognosis) DTE is used to predict the transients of 
selected state variables for a designated time period. Additionally, DTs for strategy inventory and 
for strategy assessment are introduced to support the decision-making process in NAMAC. 
Moreover, this study limits the scope of DTP to model-free for modeling the DTs.  
 
2.2.2. Digital Twins in NAMAC  
 
DTs establish the basis for NAMAC operation by learning from the knowledge base. DTs in 
NAMAC are developed as knowledge acquisition system that consist of various surrogate models 
to support different NAMAC functions (e.g., diagnosis, strategy inventory formulation, prognosis, 
strategy assessment). As NAMAC adopts a modular architecture, DTs are designed and developed 
as individual modules based on their functions in NAMAC system. Depending on these functions, 
the DT in NAMAC consists of four categories:  
 
• Interrogative DT or DT for Diagnosis (DT-D), 
• DT for Strategy Inventory (DT-SI), 
• Predictive DT or DT for Prognosis (DT-P),  
• DT for Strategy Assessment (DT-SA).   
 
The workflow for DT development is shown in Figure 2. The problem specification defines the 
analysis purpose, quantities of interest, issue space (or scenario space), system configurations, 
failure modes, etc. This information is gathered from the knowledge base (layer 1 in NAMAC 
integral workflow). Based on the issue space, model specifications for each DT are determined. 
The database for training different DT models is generated by sampling the scenario space using 
the data generation engine (RAVEN-GOTHIC interface). Since the type and class of DTs vary, 
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model specifications are defined based on functional, modeling, and interface requirements for 
each class of models. The functional requirement states the function of each DT model 
(constituting DTE). The interfacing requirement describes the inputs and outputs of the model 
(constituting DTI). The modeling requirement determines the implementation methods of the 
model (constituting DTP). 
 
 
Figure 2: DT developmental workflow 
 
2.2.3. Implementation of DTs in NAMAC 
 
The DT-D aims to assimilate data from the operating plant to evaluate the complete states of a 
physical systems, including unobservable state variables, operating and fault conditions. In nuclear 
applications, the interrogative DTs are also known as fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) models. 
Since the model-based FDD methods are limited due to the requirement for an accurate model, 
model-free FDD (especially the data-driven FDD methods) have become popular as it does not 
explicitly rely on the mathematical models. By constructing DT-D with machine learning and AI 
approaches, significant progress has been made with model-free methods for FDD applications in 
reactors. As one of the model-free methods, data-driven methods have been applied with various 
tools, including artificial neural networks, support vector machine, auto-associate kernel 
regression, Principal Component Analysis, etc. The objective of these approaches is to construct a 
relationship between correlated state variables. If all variables are observable, by monitoring the 
changes in residuals between the measurements and output variables from DT-D, system faults 
can be detected when there are statistically abnormal changes. If outputs are unobservable safety-
significant state variables, the DT-D can be used to support predictions by DT-P, to find 
appropriate control actions from the operational manuals and procedures, or to directly inform 
operator. In this study, DT-D is used to determine the unobservable state variables that are 
potentially safety-significant, defined as Safety-Significant Factors (SSFs), including peak fuel 
centerline temperature and peak cladding temperature. Meanwhile, NAMAC is making decisions 
and recommendations based on these parameters, which are related to both the performance and 
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safety conditions of the reactors. They are unobservable as this study assumes that the SSFs cannot 
be directly measured by sensors. Eq. 1 shows a general form of DT-D; 𝑓𝐷𝑇−𝐷 is the data-driven 
model of DT-D; 𝑋𝐷 = [𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑖, … ] represents input variables of the DT-D model; 𝑃𝐷 =
[𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑗, … ] represent training and design hyper-parameters of DT, including network 
structures, error requirements, etc.; 𝐾𝐵𝐷 represents the knowledge base used to train the data-
driven models, including simulation databases, user knowledge in feature selections and 
preprocessing; 𝜀𝐷 represents the error of DT-D model. Although parameters 𝑃𝐷 and 𝐾𝐵𝐷 are 
implicitly involved, they are known to have significant impacts on the data-driven models and 
machine learning algorithms [16].  
 
 𝑆𝑆𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑓𝐷𝑇−𝐷(𝑋𝐷, 𝑃𝐷 , 𝐾𝐵𝐷) + 𝜀𝐷 Eq. 1 
 
Figure 3 shows the principal scheme of the data-driven DT-D. The dashed line represents an 
indirect or implicit involvement of the DT-D model.  
 
 
Figure 3: Scheme of data-driven DT-D model for evaluating SSFs.  
 
Besides data-driven methods, signal-based FDD methods are also classified as another model-free 
method, where decisions are made by comparing features from signal against “baseline” 
characteristics. Spectrum analysis, and its extensions, time-frequency analysis and wavelet 
transform, are typical signal-based FDD methods. Signal-based methods have been used in NPP 
applications for instrument monitoring, equipment vibration monitoring, acoustic emission 
monitoring, etc. Compared to data-driven methods, signal-based FDD methods are mostly limited 
to component and sub-system levels. To recover the complete conditions of reactor or suggest 
control actions to operators, data-driven methods tend to be more attractive for practical 
applications since they are more feasible to implement than mechanistic models. Moreover, data-
driven methods are preferred since they can learn from a large amount of operational and 
maintenance data, and they are able to capture complex correlations among state variables. 
However, the applicability of data-driven methods is mostly limited by the training and design 
hyper-parameters (𝑃𝐷) and the training knowledge base (𝐾𝐵𝐷) of DTs. Therefore, in addition to 
the regular testing procedures during the training of data-driven models, assessments are needed 
in the context of application scope. 
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DT for strategy inventory (DT-SI) aims to identify available actions based on the current state of 
the reactor (i.e., diagnosed plant state at the current time step), reactor’s safety limits, and 
component’s control limits. Implementation of strategy inventory requires knowledge of reactor 
system dynamics, technical specification, operating procedure, etc. Different approaches can be 
adopted for implementation of DT-SI. The basic option is to use a grid-based algorithm that search 
for available actions across the entire action space. Another option is to use AI declarative 
approaches like Answer Set Programming (ASP). Hanna et al. [17] have used ASP to build an 
operator support system that can perform fault diagnosis, informs operator of different scenarios 
and consequence, and generates control options. Reinforcement Learning (RL) can also be used to 
generate control options. RL is an intrusive approach that requires a model of the reactor 
(“environment” in RL terminology) to explore control actions based on the reward function. In the 
supervisory control system by Cetiner et al. [5], control options are determined based on a 
probabilistic decision-making module and fault tree and event tree (FT/ET) models. However, the 
amount of data points in the current knowledge base is too limited to ensure the trustworthiness of 
strategies made by RL. In addition, since the present case study aims to demonstrate NAMAC with 
a simplified issue space, FT/ET is not available for strategy inventory. At the same time, ASP is 
suitable for problems with complex logics and reasoning. Since the current strategy inventory 
adopts a simple reasoning process, it greatly decreases the necessity of applying ASP. As a result, 
DT-SI is implemented by grid-based sampling methods. Although the searching process can be 
computationally expensive than other sophisticated techniques, it is more preferred to identify all 
possible actions with simple techniques. 
 
Figure 4 shows the scheme of DT-SI model to determine a feasible set of control actions according 
to the diagnosed state of the reactor (complete reactor information) at the current time. The 
knowledge base for DT-SI provides the success path for mitigative actions and constraints due to 
control and safety limits of the reactor components. The dashed line represents an indirect or 
implicit involvement of the DT-SI model.  
 
  
Figure 4: Scheme of DT-SI model to determine a feasible set of control action based on the plant 
diagnosis. 
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The DT-P aims to predict the future transients of state variables or lifecycles of certain components 
based on the past histories and current information. In manufacturing and medical applications, 
they are usually implemented through data analytical models [18]. In nuclear applications, most 
predictive DTs are implemented by combining model-based methods with a Probabilistic Risk 
Analysis (PRA) framework: the PRA framework accounts for the component failures and control 
actions, while the system code predicts consequences along all paths. In the supervisory control 
system by Cetiner et al. [5], event/fault trees are combined with the MODELICA plant model to 
predict the future transients with faults reflected by PRA. In “SMART” procedures, a dynamic 
Bayesian network is constructed to represent the causal relationships between previous system 
states and likely states of reactor parameters in the event of instrument or control-room failures. 
There are a few applications under development for constructing DT-P with data-driven methods. 
In the operator support tool by J.H. Lee et al. [7], deep learning techniques are trained as a surrogate 
of analysis toolkit for dynamic accident progression. The analysis toolkit is built by combining 
dynamic event tree with a set of simulation codes. In the SP-100 system [4], a Controlled Auto-
Regressive and Integrated Moving Average model is constructed, and its parameters are calibrated 
continuously based on measurement values. Compared to prognosis by direct plant models, data-
driven models can make predictions with acceptable accuracy starting from an arbitrary point 
during a transient. Moreover, the running speed of DT-P by data-driven methods is fast enough to 
support real-time operations. The performance of dynamic Bayesian network usually relies on 
expert inputs in assigning the conditional probabilities and connections between different nodes, 
while the data-driven methods can capture time sequences and nonlinear correlations among 
variables by directly learning from the database. As a result, this study trains a synthetic DT-P 
model with data-driven methods to predict the consequence factor 𝐶 of control actions 𝐴 =
{𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑖, … } and information 𝑋 at the current time point 𝑡0.Eq. 2 shows the general form of 
DT-P, and 𝑓𝐷𝑇−𝑃 represents the DT-P model implemented by the data-driven methods; 𝜀𝑃 
represents the error of DT-P model. Similar to the DT-D, model parameters 𝑃𝑃 and knowledge 
base 𝐾𝐵𝑃 are also included.  
 
 𝐶𝐴,𝑋 = 𝑓𝐷𝑇−𝑃(𝐴, 𝑋𝑡0 , 𝑃𝑃, 𝐾𝐵𝑃) + 𝜀𝑃 Eq. 2 
 
Figure 5 shows the principal scheme of the data-driven DT-P, and the dashed line represents an 
indirect or implicit involvement to the DT-P model. By including a decision-analysis model (DT-
SA), the consequence factor 𝐶 predicted by DT-P can be used to assess strategies from the strategy 
inventory. Meanwhile, the factor 𝐶𝐴,𝑋 can also be used directly by operators for deciding control 
actions.  
12 
 
 
Figure 5: Scheme of data-driven DT-P model for predicting the consequences of control actions 
based on the current system information.  
 
The DT for Strategy Assessment (DT-SA) can be described as a decision-making module that aims 
to rank the control actions based on a consequence factor (obtained from prognosis) and a user-
defined preference structure. The preference structure is based on decision-makers’ preference for 
safety, operability and/or performance of the reactor. Different approaches can be adopted for 
implementation of DT-SA. Apostolakis et al. [19] use multi-attribute utility theory to evaluate 
decision choices for reduction in the containment integrated leakage rate tests. The decision 
choices are evaluated based on relative preference for safety, economics, and stakeholder relation. 
In the supervisory control system by Cetiner et al. [5], a utility theory algorithm is employed to 
perform strategy assessment. Utility functions are defined for key reactor parameters based on the 
safety and operation limits. In this study, strategy assessment is performed by finding the limit 
surface [20] where the control inputs cause transition from safe to unsafe consequences. Control 
options are ranked based on the safety margin, while impact of component reliability and 
operability (economic aspect) is not included in the initial demonstration documented in this paper 
but will be considered in the future work. Hence, preference structure is governed by the safety 
criteria alone. Figure 6 shows the scheme of DT-SA for strategy assessment based on the 
preference structure. The knowledge base for DT-SA provides necessary information and/or 
guidance to construct the preference structure for decision making. The dashed line represents an 
indirect or implicit involvement of the DT-SA model. 
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Figure 6: Scheme of DT-SA for strategy assessment according to the preference structure 
 
2.2.4. Data-driven modeling for digital twins in NAMAC  
 
The mathematical expressions of data-driven models typically have implicit model forms and 
model parameters with no engineering or physical meanings. When constructing DTs for diagnosis 
and prognosis, the data-driven models use processed data from simulations and/or operations to 
extract information out of big data sets. Meanwhile, preprocessing techniques filter the raw data 
to improve the training efficiency and predictive capability. Popular data-driven techniques 
include polynomials, artificial neural networks, principal component regression, and support 
vector regression, etc. to capture the relevant process behavior from data. According to the 
difference in calibration or learning approaches, there are supervised and unsupervised learning 
algorithms. For supervised learning, inputs and outputs are clearly labelled, and the goal is to 
calibrate the model parameters such that the errors between predicted and measured outputs are 
minimized. An unsupervised algorithm does not use output data and no reference values are needed 
for model calibration. An example of unsupervised learning is clustering or principal component 
analysis.  
 
In this study, one of the supervised algorithms, feedforward neural network, is trained for the 
implementation of DT-D and DT-P. The topology of feedforward neural networks consists of a set 
of neurons connected by links in a number of layers. A multilayer feedforward network is shown 
in Figure 7. The basic configuration of feedforward networks usually includes an input layer, 
hidden layers, and an output layer. After the training, the same mapping with fixed weights are 
applied from the input to the output space. In other words, the state of any neuron only depends 
on the input-output pattern, but not the initial and past states of the neuron. Therefore, no dynamic 
representation is involved, and such network topology is classified as static neural networks. A 
static feedforward network can be built with simple optimizing algorithms, and it has become one 
of the most popular network architectures in use today.  
 
Digital twin for 
strategy 
assessment 
Knowledge Base 
𝐾𝐵𝑆𝐴 
Plant 
 simulator 
Strategy inventory 
Control 
Action 𝐴 
Preference 
structure 
Recommended 
action 
Prognosis 
Consequence 
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Figure 7: The basic configuration of a multi-layer feedforward neural networks 
 
Eq. 3 to Eq. 5 show the mathematical formulation of feedforward neural networks. Eq. 3 gives the 
input vector ?⃗? with 𝑛 elements. Eq. 4 shows the model inside each hidden unit (𝐻𝑈) where 𝑖 and 
𝑗 are the 𝑖𝑡ℎ inputs, and 𝑗  indexes hidden units. 𝑤𝑗𝑖 and 𝑏𝑗 are weights and biases for each hidden 
unit. 𝜎 is the nonlinear activation function. ?̂? is the output of neural networks, where 𝑚 represents 
the 𝑚𝑡ℎ output layer (𝑜).  
 
 ?⃗? = [𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛] Eq. 3 
 
𝐻𝑈𝑗(?⃗?) = 𝜎(∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
) Eq. 4 
 
?̂?(𝐻𝑈⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗) = ∑ 𝑤𝑜𝑗𝑖𝐻𝑈𝑖 + 𝑏𝑜
𝑚
𝑖=1
 Eq. 5 
 
Eq. 6 is a loss function that optimizes parameters of neural networks, where 𝑁 is the total number 
of training targets 𝑦. For regression problems, the L2 squared norm is usually used.  
 
 
𝐿𝐷 =
1
2𝑁
∑(𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 Eq. 6 
 
To avoid overfitting, a regularization term is added to the loss function (Eq. 7), where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
loss function parameters. 𝐿𝑊 is the sum of squares of the network weights. In Bayesian 
regularization, neural network parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝑤𝑗𝑖 are treated as random variables and 
updated according to the Bayes’ rules [21].  
 
 𝐿𝐹 = 𝛽𝐿𝐷 + 𝛼𝐿𝑊 Eq. 7 
 
The objective of a neural-network training is not only to have a model that could best represent 
the training data, but also new data on which the model will be used to make predictions. However, 
it is a challenge to generalize the model from known data points to new data points in unknown 
domains, and this challenge is a generalization problem [22]. In addition to a good-fit model that 
both learns and generalizes well, a model can be either under-fit or over-fit. Underfitting is easier 
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to detect and mainly controlled by the final training loss and maximum epoch number in the 
training process. Since the stochastic gradient descent algorithm is an iterative learning algorithm 
that uses the training dataset to update the neural network model, the epoch number is a 
hyperparameter of gradient descent that controls the number of complete passes through the 
training dataset. The model will stop updating if the loss function 𝐿𝐷 reaches a final training loss 
or epoch number reaches the maximum epoch number. However, an over-fit model can hardly be 
diagnosed when only the training data is available since the model output usually has very small 
biases and variance comparing to the real data. Common techniques for reducing overfitting 
include setting early stop criteria, separating a validation set from the training data, testing the 
model with more data. Meanwhile, it is also suggested that the complexity of the network should 
be adaptive and comparable to the idiosyncrasies of training databases [23]. Therefore, considering 
the severe consequences of DT accuracy in engineering applications, it is stressed that both errors 
and generalization capability of any DT implementations should be assessed after the training. 
Meanwhile, neural-network-based DTs should evolve from simple structures (i.e. topologies and 
hyperparameters) to more complex patterns.  
 
2.2.5. Phases of data-driven digital twin development 
 
Considering the complexity of parameter selections and knowledge base construction, the DT 
development process is classified into three phases: scoping, refinement, and maturation. Table 1 
defines the phases of DT training and developments for autonomous control systems. In all phases, 
it is required that DT prototypes and instances are implemented in the designed environments for 
the target applications. Meanwhile, it is also required that DT errors be analyzed, and that they 
satisfy the acceptance criteria. At the scoping stage, users design the acceptance criteria, DT 
training, and design hyper-parameters. However, there are potentially large uncertainties and 
biases due to the limited knowledge of user groups. Although the DT uncertainties satisfy the 
acceptance criteria, they are limited by users’ knowledge in designing the evaluation metrics and 
acceptance criteria. As a result, at the scoping stage, it is likely that the DT uncertainty in the target 
applications is so large that it could alter outcomes of directly related blocks. For instance, the 
large uncertainty of DT-D model could lead the operator to misunderstand the states or faults in 
the reactor system; it may also change the prediction of consequence factors by the DT-P model. 
Many lessons will be learned at this stage, especially in evaluating the effects of hyper-parameters, 
designing assessment metrics, and determining potential technology impacts.  
 
At the refinement stage, the major sources of uncertainty and bias are refined by improving users’ 
knowledge or formalizing the development and assessment process. The DT uncertainty can still 
be large, however, they should be better characterized and continuously decreased in a consistent 
and transparent manner. Uncertainty quantification is one of the major techniques in the refinement 
stage that refers to the activity of identifying, understanding, and quantifying all possible 
uncertainties within the system of interest [24]. For ML algorithms, Bayesian inference can be 
used to optimize hyperparameters based on a prior distribution and additional observations [25]. 
Interval analysis is used to accelerate the convergence of ML to the global minimal point or to 
guarantee that all solutions are found to any degree of accuracy with guaranteed bounds [26]. 
Meta-learning, i.e. learning to learn, divides a large learning task into two hierarchies of learning: 
base learner and meta learner. Compared to the classical training for ML-based DTs, denoted as 
the base learner, there is also a meta model that optimizes the base learner by updating its 
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parameters via a meta-knowledge base [27]. In addition to the separate DTs development and 
assessment, the quantitative software reliability method [28] and digital instrumentation & control 
(I&C) assessment [29] evaluate the reliability and risk of the autonomous control system and 
digital I&C by quantifying the software failure rates and the risks to reactor component and system. 
As a result, at the refinement stage, the impacts of uncertainty and bias on operators’ decisions and 
directly-connected DTs are known, and resources can be directed to areas with insufficient 
knowledge. The largest amount of resources is expected in the refinement stage. A formalized 
framework for knowledge elicitation or parameter optimizations is required to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness in resource allocations.  
 
At maturation stage, major sources of uncertainty and bias are verified and optimized based on the 
best available methods and techniques. There are still uncertainties, but they are small compared 
to the licensing and regulatory requirements. Efforts at maturation stage focus on the license, 
certification, approval, and applications of DTs and NAMAC, including reactor controls, reactor 
system/sub-system/component designs, etc.  
 
Table 1: Definition of phases in DT development 
Phase  
Major Sources of Uncertainty 
and Bias 
Consequence 
1.  Scoping 
The acceptance criteria are assigned 
by user(s) with limited knowledge 
The DT training and design hyper-
parameters are selected or assigned 
by user(s) with limited knowledge 
DT uncertainty in the final code 
adequacy is large and their impacts on 
the operator decision and outcomes of 
directly-connected DTs are uncertain 
2.  Refinement 
The acceptance criteria are refined 
by user(s) with improved 
knowledge or formalized 
frameworks 
The DT training and design hyper-
parameters are refined by user(s) 
with improved knowledge or 
formalized optimization scheme 
DT uncertainty is large, but its impacts 
on operator or directly-connected DTs 
are sufficiently characterized  
3.  Maturation 
The acceptance criteria are verified 
The DT training and design hyper-
parameters are optimized 
DT Uncertainty is negligible 
compared to the defense-in-depth  
 
2.3. Plant simulator and data generation engine 
 
For NAMAC testing and “proof of concept” demonstration, a plant simulator is required. A system 
code with embedded virtual instrumentation and control knobs is employed as a plant simulator. 
A simplified five-channel model for EBR-II has been developed in GOTHIC and benchmarked 
against experimental data to serve as a plant simulator [30]. This simplified EBR-II model contains 
the primary loop of the of the EBR-II system which consist of two centrifugal pumps (PSP1 and 
PSP2), a Low Pressure Plenum (LPP), a High Pressure Plenum (HPP), the active core, an Upper 
Plenum (UP) and an Intermediate Heat Exchanger (IHX). The two centrifugal pumps fulfill the 
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task of liquid sodium circulation over the primary loop. The liquid sodium is drawn from the 
sodium tank by PSP1 and PSP2, which inject the coolant into the HPP and LPP.  The HPP is 
connected to the active core to cool the EBR-II subassemblies, the control rods and inner reflector. 
The LPP directs the liquid sodium to the outer blanket. The hot coolant joins the “Z-pipe” from 
the UP and heads to the IHX. Boundary conditions impose the temperature of the argon and the 
sodium in the sodium tank on the inlet side. To simulate the heat sink that cools the primary loop 
by the intermediate loop, a simplified representation of the IHX on the intermediate loop side uses 
a flow and pressure boundary conditions. This simplified EBR-II model has been verified in terms 
of reactivity feedback, total core power, peak cladding temperature, and flow rate in primary 
pumps and the z-pipe. The level of consistency between the full-scale model and simplified EBR-
II model is deemed sufficient to support the NAMAC proof of concept study presented in this 
paper. Three transients are simulated with the simplified GOTHIC model and compared against a 
validated SASSYS model [31]. The results of the simulations compare reasonably well. On the 
functional level this GOTHIC plant simulator operates in parallel with NAMAC to: 
 
• Simulate the accident scenario for the case study; 
• Generate virtual sensor data for plant state diagnosis; 
• Accept control recommendations from NAMAC system.  
 
The same system code (GOTHIC) is used to generate training/testing data for the development of 
DTs with different functions. We explicitly chose GOTHIC as both the plant simulator and data 
generation engine to isolate uncertainties (due to various data-driven models) during the testing 
phase.  
 
The scheme for operation of data generation engine (RAVEN-GOTHIC interface) is described as 
follows. The EBR-II model is first modelled in steady state with GOTHIC to establish the normal 
operation regime of the plant. GOTHIC outputs a restart file representative of the steady state and 
a transient scenario is implemented through a GOTHIC-formatted text-based file called GOTHIC 
Command File (GCF). Perturbed variables (e.g. a pump speed change, a valve speed closure etc.) 
are flagged in the GCF to allow RAVEN sampling. A separate XML-based input file defines the 
RAVEN settings: number of samples (N), distribution type associated to the variables, variable 
bounds, and targeted outputs (i.e. potential features). The RAVEN execution replaces the variables 
drawn from the RAVEN source code into the GCF and runs successively the N samples with the 
GOTHIC solver. At the end the N GOTHIC executions, RAVEN parses the GOTHIC outputs 
(SGR files) and dumps the targeted parameters into a Comma separated file (CSV) or a HDF5 
files. The CSV or HDF5 files are stored for DT training purposes. Figure 8 summarizes the 
workflow described above.  
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Figure 8: RAVEN/GOTHIC workflow  
 
2.4. NAMAC operational workflow 
 
Figure 9 shows the operational workflow of NAMAC system, the DT-D, and DT-P are highlighted. 
The workflow is developed based on the safety analysis literature [32], operating experiences, and 
control procedures of EBR-II. For the proof of concept study presented in this paper, the objective 
of the NAMAC system is to re-establish normal flow conditions during a single LOFA scenario. 
If that attempt fails, NAMAC should recommend to SCRAM the reactor. To achieve these 
objectives, a set of DTs, including diagnosis, prognosis, strategy inventory, and strategy 
assessment, are required, and they are connected according to the operational workflow. Among 
all DTs, the diagnosis and prognosis are critical in recovering full-flow conditions and preventing 
severe consequences, i.e., getting into the wrong region of the power/flow map and not promptly 
SCRAMming the reactor. The DT-D reads sensor data from the reactor or simulator to monitor 
unobservable state variables, and the objective is to restore complete information about the reactor. 
The obtained values are fed to (1) prognosis for predicting future transients (2) strategy inventory 
for determining available control actions (3) discrepancy checker for continuous monitoring. The 
DT-P reads reactor information from DT-D, together with available control actions, to predict the 
future transients of reactor states or consequences over a certain time range. The DT-P outputs are 
mainly used by strategy assessment for deciding the best strategies according to certain preference 
structures, which represent the preference of operator or risk management team to the economic 
and safety of a reactor. 
 
19 
 
  
Figure 9: Operational workflow of a NAMAC system for controlling EBR-II during a single 
LOFA scenario 
 
The operational workflow is designed based on the knowledge base. In this study, the emergency 
operating procedures and severe accident management guideline is adopted, and the goal is to build 
a safety case that prevents or mitigates from severe consequences. When a different advanced 
reactor system is investigated with different knowledge base, the operational workflow can vary 
from the present design. However, considering the nature of safety case as an argumentation 
toward safety goal, a similar reasoning process can be used. Moreover, it is argued that no matter 
how much a priori analysis gets done for advanced reactors, since there is no operational history, 
a system should still be doing active diagnosis, prognosis, strategy assessment, and discrepancy 
checking. 
 
3. Demonstration of NAMAC Development and Assessment 
 
This section presents a numerical demonstration of DTs and NAMAC system during the LOFA 
scenario. This demonstration is systematically illustrated based on objective, scope, DTs’ 
implementation and assessment, GOTHIC-NAMAC interaction and operation procedure, success 
criteria, results, and implication of the case study.  
 
3.1. Objective, Scope, and Assumption 
 
 This demonstration provides a proof of concept to demonstrate the capability of the NAMAC 
system as a control approach. The numerical demonstration is performed for a loss of flow due to 
a primary pump malfunction. In this case, NAMAC is expected to successfully diagnose the plant 
state, find available control actions, predict the consequence of each available action, and provide 
a plan of action that stabilizes the plant state.  
The scope of the numerical demonstration is governed by the issue space of the case study. The 
issue space for this case study encompasses a partial loss of flow in Primary Sodium Pump#1 
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(PSP1) and is fully represented by time-dependent curves of rotational speed, 𝑤1(𝑡), defined by 
Eq. 8,  
 
 
𝑤1(𝑡) = 𝑤0 (1 −
1 − (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑇1
𝑡) ,   𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝑇1 ≥ 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐 Eq. 8 
 
Here, 𝑤0 represents the nominal pump speed (in rad/s), 𝑇1 represents the ramping-down duration 
(in s) and (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑 represents the normalized pump #1 end speed. 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐 marks the time when the 
accident transient begins. By varying the pump end speed, (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑, and pump ramp down 
duration, 𝑇1, different profiles for pump ramp down can be achieved. According to the PRA 
analysis report [32], the ramping-down duration (T1) is suggested to be less than 80 seconds for 
covering the most severe case. We select the accident scenario shown in Table 2 for demonstration 
of the NAMAC system for this case study. The scenario in Table 2 focuses on accident scenarios 
where PSP1 ramps down to 50% of its nominal speed in 50 seconds. This situation implies a pump 
coast-down rate of 1 rad/sec. The available control options to counter this situation are to accelerate 
the Primary Sodium Pump # 2 (PSP2) to normalized pump velocity (𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑 for a fixed duration 
of time. Pump acceleration is triggered at time 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 which is defined by temperature thresholds 
called pump trip temperature (𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝). 𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 is based on the peak Fuel Centerline Temperature 
(𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐿). The training data set to cover this scenario is generated by uniformly sampling (𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑 
and 𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 with the sampling space defined by  [(𝑤2)𝑚𝑖𝑛,  (𝑤2)𝑚𝑎𝑥] and [(𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝)𝑚𝑖𝑛,  (𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝)𝑚𝑎𝑥] .  
(𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑 and 𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 are both uniformly sampled 32 times to generate 1024 episodes of 200 seconds 
transients. Each episode contains a 200-second transient from the same steady-state calculation 
that is loaded from a restart file (see Figure 8). Each sample output contains 2000 data points, and 
in total, there are about 2 × 106 data points in the training and testing databases. 
 
Table 2: Description of accident scenario for demonstrations 
Initial condition Accident scenario 
Available control 
options 
Constraints 
Reactor is 
operating at 
nominal power 
𝑃0, and both 
pumps are 
operating at 
nominal 
rotational speed 
𝑤0 
Pump #1 
malfunction:  
Pump #1 motor 
rotational velocity 
𝑤1 linearly coasts 
down to (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑 
in  𝑇1, (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑 =
50%, 𝑇1 = 50𝑠𝑒𝑐 
(pump #1 coast 
down rate =1 
rad/sec) 
Increase PSP 2 
rotational velocity 𝑤2 
towards (𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑 for a 
fixed duration. Pump 
acceleration begins at 
time 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 defined by 
some threshold value 
called pump trip 
temperature (𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝). 
The reactor’s peak fuel 
centerline temperature 𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐿 
is picked as the safety 
significant factor. 
The 𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐿 is maintained at 
given set ranges 
[(𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐿)𝑙𝑜𝑤,  (𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐿)ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ] 
 
 
Additional scenarios (see cases A and C in Table 7) with pump coastdown rate greater or less than 
1 rad/sec are generated to evaluate the performance of the NAMAC system when it ventures 
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outside the training domain. These scenario sets lie within the issue space but are not covered by 
the present training database.  
 
For now, the measurement error in the sensor data is assumed to be negligible. The impact of 
component reliability is not considered in this case study. It is also assumed that the accident is 
known as soon as it is injected and that NAMAC makes recommendations as soon as the sensor 
information is fed (no time delays). This is achieved by pausing the GOTHIC plant simulator until 
recommendation are generated and injected. The objective is to minimize uncertainties for 
development and to have control over the sensitivity of the results to NAMAC’s computational 
time. Furthermore, NAMAC needs a specific diagnosing time 𝑡𝐷 (in reactor-time scale) to collect 
information and make recommendations. Finally, the control strategies are assessed and ranked 
based only on the safety margins, while the reliability and lifetime of components are not explicitly 
considered. A range of control options for PSP2 is assigned based on the operating experiences of 
primary pumps in EBR-II [33].  
 
3.2. Digital Twin Development  
 
Based on the definition, DTs can be characterized by environment (DTE), prototype (DTP), and 
instance (DTI). Since DTs are treated as major components to the NAMAC control system, DTE 
reflects function and use case of DT, DTP suggests the modeling options, and DTI suggests the 
interface. Table 3 summarizes the implementation of the NAMAC DTs and discrepancy checker 
based on the functional, interfacing, and modeling requirements for this case study.  
 
Table 3: Implementation of requirements for DTs in function (DTE), interface (DTI), and 
modeling (DTP) 
 Function 
Interface 
Modeling 
Input Output 
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Sensory Data (𝑋𝐷): High 
pressure lower plenum 
temperature(𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑃),  low-
pressure lower plenum 
temperature (𝑇𝐿𝑃𝑃), and 
upper plenum temperature 
(𝑇𝑈𝑃) 
Unobservable 
safety significant 
factor: Fuel 
centerline 
temperature 
(𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐿) 
Static Feedforward Neural 
Networks 
Training parameters (𝑃𝐷) 
• # of Layers: 3 
• Neurons in each Layer: 
20 
• Max. Epochs: 106 
• Target mean square 
error: 10−2 
Knowledge base 𝐾𝐵𝐷: 
GOTHIC Simulation 
databases 
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▪ Constraints: pump#2 
capacity 
[(𝑤2)𝑚𝑖𝑛,  (𝑤2)𝑚𝑎𝑥], 
Trip temperature 
[(𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝)𝑚𝑖𝑛,  (𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝)𝑚𝑎𝑥]  
▪ Safety significant factor 
(𝑋𝑡0): Fuel Centerline 
Temperature (𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐿) 
Control 
procedures: trip 
points (𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝) and 
control inputs 
(𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑 
Uniform sampling 
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▪ Safety significant factors 
(𝑋𝑡0): initial value of fuel 
centerline temperature 
and its time derivative 
from diagnosis 
[𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿 ,
𝑑𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿
𝑑𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
]
𝑡0
 
▪ Control procedures: trip 
points (𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝) and control 
inputs ((𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑) from 
strategy planning, i.e., 
[(𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑, 𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝  ]  
▪ Constraint on fuel 
centerline temperature, 
(𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐿)𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 
A class of global 
factors 
(prediction of 
safety significant 
reactor state 
variables) over a 
time range (200 s 
transient) 
Static Feedforward Neural 
Networks 
Training parameters (𝑃𝑝):  
• # of layers: 3 
• Neuron in each layer: 
20 
• Max. Epochs: 106 
• Target mean square 
error: 10−3 
Knowledge base 𝐾𝐵𝑃: 
GOTHIC Simulation 
databases 
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▪ Preference structure 
(safety limit for the 
predicted state variable) 
▪ Control procedures (trip 
points and control inputs 
from strategy planning) 
▪ Predicted state variables 
(from prognosis) 
▪ Constraints 
▪ Recommended 
operator 
actions 
▪ Recommended 
global factor 
and short-term 
state transients 
▪ Simple decision analysis 
using limit surface which 
identifies the set of 
control inputs that causes 
transition of label from 
safe to unsafe 
▪ Safety margin is defined 
based on the preference 
structure to rank control 
strategies 
 
The performance of data-driven DTs (i.e., DT-D and DT-P) is dominated by the error between 
predicted and real values. Therefore, an accuracy criterion is specified by users’ knowledge. To 
ensure the fairness of this assignment, the value of the criteria has been reviewed by members with 
backgrounds in both data science and nuclear STH. A distance error metric, Root Mean Square 
Error (RMSE) between predicted and real values is used to quantify the accuracy of DTs, and it is 
required that RMSEs are less than 5% of DT outputs or Quantities of Interest (QoIs). The accuracy 
criteria are not fixed, and their assignments need to be formalized by a decision-theoretic 
framework.  
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𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √
1
𝑁
∑(𝑄𝑜𝐼𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑠 − 𝑄𝑜𝐼𝑜𝑏𝑠)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 Eq. 9 
 
A three-layer feedforward neural network is constructed by MATLAB, and Bayesian 
regularization backpropagation is used as the learning algorithm for both diagnosis and prognosis 
DTs. For DT-D model, the peak fuel centerline temperature 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿 is selected as the unobservable 
state variable that is safety significant, and it is evaluated based on sodium temperature measured 
at three locations inside the core: UP sodium temperature 𝑇𝑈𝑃, HPP sodium temperature 𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑃, and 
LPP sodium temperature 𝑇𝐿𝑃𝑃. As a result, variables and values for sets of inputs, training 
parameters, and knowledge bases as in Eq. 1 can be selected (see DT-D in Table 3 for details). The 
DT-SI uniformly samples the control options based on the evaluated value of unobservable safety 
significant factor obtained from diagnosis (see DT-SA in Table 3). The DT-P predicts the transient 
of safety significant reactor state variable and consequences over a specified duration of time. The 
maximum 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿 in 200 sec after the steady state restart time is selected as the QoI, and it is 
predicted based on a set of parameters and variables as in Eq. 2 (see DT-P in Table 3 for details). 
The DT-SA is performed by finding the limit surface where control inputs cause transition from 
safe to unsafe consequences (see DT-SA in Table 3 for details). 
 
Impact of component reliability on the strategy is not included in this initial demonstration study. 
It should be noted that the diagnosis and prognosis models presented in Table 3 are based on 
preliminary implementations (baseline option) and have been individually trained and tested for 
the accident scenario specified in Table 2. However, the performance of these models in the 
integral NAMAC system needs to be determined.  
 
In Table 3, [(𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑, 𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝] is the control action set 𝐴; (𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑 is the final and steady rotational 
speed of the primary pump; 𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 is the temperature point that triggers the injection of pump actions 
𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑑. [𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿,
𝑑𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿
𝑑𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
]
𝑡0
 is the information set 𝑋 at time point 𝑡0; [𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿]𝑡0 represents the peak fuel 
centerline temperature at time 𝑡0, while [ 𝑑𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿 𝑑𝑡⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ]𝑡0
 represents the time gradient of peak fuel 
centerline temperature at time 𝑡0; the bar notation suggests that this number is approximated 
numerically by a finite difference scheme as shown in Eq. 10: 
 
 𝑑𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿
𝑑𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
=
([𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿]𝑡0 − [𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿]𝑡0−∆𝑡)
∆𝑡
 Eq. 10 
 
Here, ∆𝑡 is the time range for numerically approximating the time gradient of peak fuel centerline 
temperature. To account for the effect of this number, three time ranges are used at the same time 
for redundancy. It is suggested that the feature selections have been embodied inside the 
regularization methods during the neural network training. As a result, the insignificant variables 
will be automatically reduced and reflected in the weights and biases within the networks. Figure 
10 compares the predicted outputs by DT-D and DT-P against real values from databases. Most 
points fall onto the 45-degree line, implying that good accuracy is achieved for both DT 
implementations.  
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Figure 10: Comparison of predicted output against real values from databases for DT-D (left) 
and DT-P (right) models. Dash lines are diagonal lines 
 
The RMSEs of DT-D and DT-P in the training process are 1.42℃ and 0.54℃ respectively. Both 
errors satisfy the acceptance criteria that the RMSE is less than 5% of QoIs ([−30, 30]℃). The 
DT-SI generates control strategies based on the DT-D outputs, safety and control limits. In the 
current implementation, control actions are generated by uniform distributions for trip temperature 
 𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 and PSP2 end speed (𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑. The DT-SA ranks the control procedure and makes 
recommendations for operator actions. In the current implementation, strategy assessment is based 
on the limit surface. The limit surface identifies the set of control inputs that causes transition of 
the SSF from safe to unsafe region. By defining the safety margin for each available control action 
𝑖 as Eq. 11, the acceptable region and the optimal actions can be identified.  
 
 𝑆𝑖 = (𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿)𝑙𝑖𝑚 − [𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿)]𝑖. Eq. 11 
 
where (𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿)𝑙𝑖𝑚 is the safety limit for the Peak Fuel Centerline Temperature (PFCL). In this 
study, the number is assigned based on user’s knowledge. [𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿)]𝑖 is the maximum PFCL 
predicted by the DT-P model for control action 𝑖. Figure 11 (a) depicts the safety region with 
positive safety margins 𝑆𝑖, which represents a set of control options, including trip temperature 
 𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 and PSP2 end speed (𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑 that will keep maximum PFCL 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿) below the safety 
limit (𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿)𝑙𝑖𝑚. Figure 11 (b) shows the variation of that region due to different selections of 
safety limits. Although the region is changed due to safety limits, the optimal control actions with 
maximum margin remain the same.  
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Figure 11: Plot of safety regions (a) predicted by NAMAC versus observations from the 
GOTHIC plant simulator with (TPFCL)lim=685℃. (b) with three different (TPFCL)lim. 
 
3.3. Digital Twin Assessment 
 
Since DTs are integrated into the NAMAC control system, and they potentially have significant 
impacts on the reactor safety, it is critical to assess the accuracy of DT implementations not only 
in the training process, but also during testing and applications. In this study, a list of sources of 
uncertainty is prepared based on classifications by M. Kläs et al. [34]  Meanwhile, the error 
assessment works are inspired by Verification, Validation and Uncertainty Quantification 
(VVUQ) guidelines for scientific computing [24]. 
 
Table 4 shows the list of sources of uncertainty and their relative impacts on the DTs’ accuracy 
based on the qualitative assessment results. It is stressed that the current assessments are at scoping 
stage, where the acceptance criteria, sources of uncertainty, samples and distributions of 
parameters, even the criteria for deciding relative impacts, are made by user knowledge and subject 
to refinement. For the current implementation of DT for diagnosis (DT-D) and selection of training 
and testing databases, it is found that in both training and testing cases, the accuracy of DT-D is 
highly correlated to input time ranges, sensor failures, final training loss, and database coverage. 
For the current implementation of DT-P, it is found that in training case, the DT-P accuracy is 
highly correlated with the final training loss. However, that correlation is not observed in the 
testing case. Moreover, the DT-P accuracy is found to be highly correlated with the database 
coverage when DT-P is applied to a different testing case. In consequence, considering the 
complexity of transients and difficulty in making predictions for future states, it is suggested that 
advanced machine learning algorithms should be adopted, especially for prognosis, such that the 
complexity of networks is comparable to data. Meanwhile, since the implementation of DTs is 
highly affected by multiple sources of uncertainty, it is also suggested that a formalized DT 
development and assessment process should be developed. The objective is to implement DTs in 
a transparent, consistent, and improvable manner, where refinements on DTs can be made based 
on the previous development and assessment results. More details in results are discussed in 
Appendix A.  
 
(a) (b) 
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Table 4: A list of sources of uncertainty, formulations, and findings for data-driven DT models in 
the preliminary quantitative assessment 
Category 
Sources of 
uncertainty 
Parameter range Findings 
Digital Twin for Diagnosis 
Input 
variables 
Input time 
ranges 𝑡𝐷 
[0,200] 
Errors are negligible when DT-D is 
monitoring 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿 within a time range 
of 35s after 𝑡0 with given networks 
and training algorithms 
Sensor failure 
Inputs with N/A 
values 
Errors are more sensitive to sensor 
failures at high-pressure plenum with 
given networks and training 
algorithms 
Training 
parameters 
Final training 
loss 𝜀𝐷 
[10−3, 10] 
Errors are strongly affected by 
accuracy requirements with given 
networks and training algorithms 
Knowledge 
base 
Database 
coverage 
Mutual information 
between training and 
testing data 
distributions 
Errors are strongly affected by 
coverage conditions based on the 
current coverage metrics 
Digital Twin for Prognosis 
Training 
parameters 
Final training 
loss 𝜀𝐷 
[10−3, 10] 
Errors are only slightly affected by 
accuracy requirements with given 
networks and training algorithms  
Knowledge 
base 
Database 
coverage 
Interpolated and 
extrapolated 
conditions 
Errors are strongly affected by 
coverage conditions based on the 
current coverage metrics 
Digital Twin for Strategy Inventory 
Input 
variables 
Error propagated from DT-D 
Error in DT-D strongly affects the 
selection of control actions  
Knowledge 
base 
Control parameter space coverage 
Sampling grid resolution strongly 
affects the efficacy of the control 
parameter space coverage 
Input 
variables 
Error propagated from DT-D 
Error in DT-D strongly affects the 
selection of control actions  
Digital Twin for Strategy Assessment 
Input 
Error propagated from DT-P  Error in DT-P and DT-SI leads to 
error in recommended control action Error propagated from DT-SI 
Knowledge 
base 
Selection of safety limits 
Selection of safety limits does not 
affect the recommendation for 
optimal control actions 
 
3.4. NAMAC-GOTHIC Coupled System Development 
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A coupled-system interface has been created for explicit coupling of NAMAC and GOTHIC plant 
simulator model. The timeline of different events and sequence of processes for NAMAC-
GOTHIC interaction are described in the following steps (see Figure 12 and Figure 13 for 
illustration): 
 
i. A waiting period of 𝑡𝑤  is assumed during which the plant simulator operates under steady 
state. The steady state conditions are provided by the .SDM file from GOTHIC. At time 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑐𝑑 − 𝑡𝐷, fault is injected by ramping down the rotational speed of PSP1 or reducing the 
torque to a specific value. Here, 𝑡𝐷 is the NAMAC time range for diagnosis. When time  
𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑐𝑑 = 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝐷 is reached (step ① in Figure 12), the GOTHIC plant simulator is paused, 
and it resumes operation when new actions are injected by NAMAC.  
 
ii. GOTHIC output files (.SGR file containing sensor data ) are  processed and injected into the 
NAMAC diagnosis and discrepancy checker for reactor-state analysis and control (step ② in 
Figure 12).  
 
iii. NAMAC diagnoses the plant state and makes recommendations based on the inherent DTs and 
sensory inputs (step ③ in Figure 12). NAMAC diagnosis monitors the plant state (fuel 
centerline temperature) based on the observable sensor data (see Table 3 for details). The 
strategy inventory provides the control procedures based on the constraints and safety 
significant factor. The prognosis provides global factors (i.e., maximum fuel centerline 
temperature) during a predefined time range (around 200 seconds). The strategy assessment 
ranks the control action based on the safety margin and makes recommendations for operator 
actions. If no available action can be found that satisfies the safety criteria, a SCRAM signal 
is generated to cease the plant operation. 
 
iv. The discrepancy checker gets into action after the control action based on the NAMAC 
recommendation(s) is injected (i.e., at time 𝑡1 > 𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑚𝑑). It employs the diagnosis model to 
monitor the peak fuel centerline temperature and compares it with predicted peak fuel 
centerline temperature obtained from NAMAC prognosis. If the discrepancy between these 
two values exceeds a predefined limit (𝑋𝑙𝑖𝑚), a SCRAM signal is injected. However, if the 
discrepancy is less than 𝑋𝑙𝑖𝑚, then no action is taken. In this way, discrepancy checker adds 
another layer of safety to anticipate unexpected NAMAC predictions triggered by high 
uncertainties. 
 
tacc is the time for injecting pump malfunctions; trmcd is the time for making and executing 
recommendations by NAMAC; tD is the time difference between tacc and trmcd, where NAMAC 
collects information from sensors. The GOTHIC plant simulator is paused at trmcd such that the 
computational time of NAMAC is neglected.  
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Figure 12: NAMAC operation with GOTHIC plant simulator 
 
 
Figure 13: Timeline of events during NAMAC-GOTHIC interaction 
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3.5. NAMAC-GOTHIC Coupled System Assessment  
 
The success criteria for the NAMAC “proof of concept” demonstration are governed by the 
capability of the NAMAC system to correctly diagnose the plant state, find available control 
actions, predict transient and consequence of each action, and make recommendations based on a 
user-defined preference structure. As the data-driven methods for different DTs (specifically, 
diagnosis and prognosis in the current implementation) exhibit inherent modeling uncertainties, 
some errors in the prediction are expected. Therefore, a graded approach (see Table 5 for details) 
is adopted to assess the accuracy of NAMAC and to define the success criteria. To quantify the 
uncertainty of NAMAC recommendations, predictions of the maximum peak fuel centerline 
temperature 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿 during the entire transient are made and compared against simulations by the 
GOTHIC plant simulator. This prediction is used to justify if the recommendation is reasonable. 
Comparisons are made against the observed values for assessing the performance of NAMAC 
system and bounds of the target uncertainty for diagnosis is given by: 
 
 𝜀𝐷 ≤ 5%𝑄𝑜𝐼 Eq. 11 
 
Table 5: Success criteria for numerical demonstration 
Grade Description 
Level 0 Failure - NAMAC fails to diagnose the correct plant state  
Level 1 Partial success- NAMAC diagnoses the plant state within the bounds of target 
uncertainties for diagnosis but fails to provide recommendations that would 
stabilize the reactor state. Therefore, reactor is SCRAMed 
Level 2 Success- NAMAC diagnoses the plant state within the bounds of target 
uncertainties for diagnosis and provides recommendations that stabilizes the 
reactor state.  
 
Initial conditions are loaded from the .SDM files, and the plant simulator is restarted from the 
established steady state. The waiting period with steady state condition is 10,000 sec and under 
this condition, the pumps operate at their nominal speeds, sodium and fuel temperature profiles 
are established across the primary loop of the EBR-II system. The accident scenario is injected 
into the plant simulator at time 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐=10,010 sec. The accident scenario involves ramping down of 
PSP1 to 50% for a duration of 50 sec (i.e., the pump coast down rate =1 rad/sec). At time 𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑚𝑑 =
10,020, the plant simulator is paused and a data file (containing sensor data) is generated and 
passed to NAMAC for making recommendations. The output data file (simp-data-T.dat) is fed into 
NAMAC for: 
 
• Diagnosing the unobservable plant states (peak fuel centerline temperature); 
• Generating control actions (sampled PSP2 speed and trip temperature); 
• Predicting the consequences (maximum peak fuel centerline temperature for 150s 
transient); 
• Assessing control actions (safety margins); 
• Making recommendations (maximum safety margins). 
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Figure 14 shows the error in the predicted fuel centerline temperature obtained from diagnosis. 
Figure 15 shows the contour plot of safety margins against the available control actions, i.e., trip 
temperature and PSP2 speed at time 𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑚𝑑 = 10,020 sec. Based on the inherent DTs and NAMAC 
systems, NAMAC recommends an action for PSP2 or for reactor SCRAM: 
 
• At time 𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑚𝑑 = 10,020s, 10 sec after the accident being injected, NAMAC recommends 
to ramp up the PSP2 speed to maximum (150%) immediately (at 𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑚𝑑).  
• These pump conditions and reactor settings correspond to the maximum safety margin 
(+20.9℃). 
• The maximum diagnosis error is 13℃ (acceptance criteria 𝜀𝐷 ≤ 5%𝑄𝑜𝐼). 
 
Figure 14: Diagnosis error (℃) in the time range [𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐 , 𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑚𝑑] 
 
 
Figure 15: Contour plot of safety margins against the available control actions: trip temperature 
and PSP2 speed, where shaded area represents the acceptable region for control actions with 
positive safety margins 
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If the operator decides to ignore the recommendation and do nothing (see Figure 16), the 
temperature will exceed the safety criteria (685℃) and reach 698.8℃ at 𝑡 = 10,063.5s. If the 
operator decides to follow NAMAC recommendations (see Figure 17), the maximum temperature 
is 655.5℃, which is below the safety criteria. The predicted maximum temperature by NAMAC 
is 664.1℃. These results indicate that numerical demonstration with fully coupled system of 
NAMAC and GOTHIC plant simulator is completed with level 2 success criteria (see Table 5) 
when the accident scenario is covered by the training data set. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Transient of 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿, no PSP2 action is taken after the injection of PSP1 malfunction 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Transient of 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿, following NAMAC recommendation to increase PSP2 speed.  
 
Although NAMAC provides acceptable recommendations for the specified accident scenario, it is 
important to analyze the scenario adaptability when it encounters scenarios that are not covered by 
the training domain. Therefore, the NAMAC system is tested against additional scenarios with 
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different pump coast down rates [(𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑, 𝑇1] and NAMAC diagnosis time 𝑡𝐷 = [1s,10s]. These 
scenarios are categorized into three sets, A, B, and C, based on different pump coast down rates as 
shown in Table 7. Scenarios set A contains severe transients with larger pump coast down rates 
than those in training databases. Case C constitutes moderate transients with slower pump coast 
down. Scenarios set A and C are not covered by the training data. The coast-down rate of scenario 
set B is the same as that in the training data. However, the pump end speed (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑 and coast 
down duration 𝑇1 are different. Based on the predicted temperature by NAMAC and the real 
temperature from the plant simulator, errors of the NAMAC system can be determined: if the 
maximum temperature is lower than a limit, the scenario is classified as safe, otherwise, the 
scenario is unsafe. Therefore, it is possible that the predicted and real states are inconsistent when 
the system errors of NAMAC are too large.  
 
A confusion matrix [35] is defined to visualize and quantify the accuracy of NAMAC system in 
classifying the predicted consequence of control actions. Table 6 shows a table of confusion that 
defines four conditions: False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), True Positive (TP), and True 
Negative (TN). Each row of the matrix represents the instances in a predicted class while each 
column represents the instances in an actual class. These four conditions are defined as follows:  
 
• False Positive (FP):  True state is unsafe, but NAMAC prediction is safe; 
• False Negative (FN): The true state is safe, but NAMAC prediction is unsafe; 
• True Positive (TP): True state is safe, and NAMAC prediction is also safe; 
• True negative (TN): True state is unsafe, and NAMAC prediction is also unsafe. 
 
Among the four categories, TP and TN suggest correct classifications by NAMAC 
recommendations. FP and FN represent confusing classifications: FP tends to have the most 
significant impacts as NAMAC underpredicts the consequences; FN indicates that NAMAC is 
making conservative recommendations, and the severity of consequences are overpredicted. To 
have quantified results in addition to visualizations, True Positive Rate (TPR), False Negative Rate 
(FNR), False Positive Rate (FPR), and True Negative Rate (TNR) are defined to characterize the 
accuracy of the classification systems. Both the FNR and FPR represent the errors of NAMAC 
outputs, and higher values suggest larger errors. Since FP conditions could cause severe 
consequences, the acceptance criteria for FPR are expected to be lower than FNR.  
 
Table 6: Definition of confusion matrix with typical confusion rates 
  True Condition 
  Condition Positive Condition Negative 
Predicted 
Condition 
Predicted Condition 
Positive 
True Positive False Positive 
Predictive 
Condition Negative 
False Negative True Negative 
  
True Positive Rate = 
∑ True Positive
∑ Condition Positive
 
False Positive Rate = 
∑ False Positive
∑ Condition Negative
 
  
False Negative Rate = 
∑ False Negative
∑ Condition Positive
 
True Negative Rate = 
∑ True Negative
∑ Condition Negative
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Since the classification is made based on outputs from a sequence of DTs, results by confusion 
matrix represent the aggregation and propagation of DTs errors based on the operational workflow. 
The results of evaluation for the NAMAC system for cases A, B, and C are shown in Table 7. For 
scenario B, which is covered by the training data base, 100% TPR is observed. For moderate 
transients with slow pump coast down rates (i.e., case C), higher TPR is achieved, together with a 
small FNR. However, significant FPR is observed for case A, which contains severe accident 
scenarios outside the training data base. These results are expected since the uncertainty of data-
driven methods grow drastically when they are making predictions outside the training domain. It 
should be noted that the Discrepancy Checker was excluded from the NAMAC system for the 
evaluation presented in Table 7. In the occurrence of a false positive scenario, the Discrepancy 
Checker detects an anomaly and recommends to immediately SCRAM the reactor.  
 
 Table 7: NAMAC performance for different accident scenarios 
ID Pump#1 coast down rate (m) in rad/s Diagnosis time FPR TPR FNR TNR 
A 10 > 𝑚 > 1 [1s,10s] 60% 40% 0 0 
B 𝑚 = 1  [1s,10s] 0 100% 0 0 
C 0.1 < 𝑚 < 1 [1s,10s] 10% 90% 10% 90% 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This work illustrates the process of development, implementation and assessment of a Nearly 
Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) system to provide recommendations to the 
operator for maintaining the safety and/or performance of the reactor. The development process of 
the NAMAC system is illustrated by a three-layer hierarchical workflow that consists of 
knowledge base, Digital Twin (DT) development layer, and NAMAC operational layer. DTs play 
a critical role in NAMAC and are described as knowledge acquisition system to support different 
autonomous control functions.  Based on the knowledge base, a set of DTs are trained to determine 
the plant state, predict behavior of physical components or systems for candidate control actions, 
and, based on that prognosis, rank available control options. The trained DTs are assembled 
according to the NAMAC operational workflow to support the decision making process for 
selecting the optimal choices during an accident scenario.   
 
To demonstrate the capability of the NAMAC system, a case study is presented, where a baseline 
NAMAC is implemented for operating a simulator of the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-
II) during a partial Loss Of Flow Accident scenario. A simplified five channel EBR-II model in 
GOTHIC is used as the plant simulator that generates data for knowledge base and tests NAMAC 
performance with the NAMAC-GOTHIC coupled system. The database for development of 
different data-driven DTs is obtained by sampling the scenario and control parameters using the 
RAVEN-GOTHIC data generation engine. Since the data-driven methods behave as a “black box”, 
a list of sources of uncertainty, including input variables, training parameters, and knowledge base, 
is prepared to assess their relative impacts on DT errors. Based on the current implementation of 
Digital Twin for Diagnosis (DT-D), Digital Twin for Prognosis (DT-P), Digital Twin for Strategy 
Inventory (DT-SI), and Digital Twin for Strategy Assessment (DT-SA), Table 8 summarizes the 
relative impact of each source of uncertainty.  It is stressed that the current assessments are at 
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scoping stage, where the acceptance criteria, sources of uncertainty, samples and distributions of 
parameters, even the criteria for deciding relative impacts, are made by user knowledge and subject 
to refinement. 
 
Table 8: A list of sources of uncertainty for each data-driven DT models and their relative 
impacts on the DT’s performance 
Category Sources of uncertainty Relative Impacts 
DT-Ds 
Input variables 
Input time ranges 𝑡𝐷 Negligible  
Sensor failure 
High to sensor failures at high-pressure 
plenum 
Training 
parameters 
Final training loss 𝜀𝐷 High 
Knowledge base Database coverage High 
DT-P 
Training 
parameters 
Final training loss 𝜀𝐷 Low 
Knowledge base Database coverage High 
DT-SI 
Input variables 
Error propagated from 
diagnosis 
High 
Knowledge base 
Control parameter space 
coverage 
High 
Input variables Error propagated from DT-D High 
DT-SA 
Input 
Error propagated from DT-P  High 
Error propagated from DT-SI High 
Knowledge base Selection of safety limits No 
 
For the current implementation of DT-D and selection of training/testing databases, it is found that 
in both training and testing cases, the accuracy of DT-D is highly correlated to all listed sources 
of uncertainty. For the current implementation of DT-P, it is found that in training case, the DT-P 
accuracy is highly correlated with the final training loss. However, that correlation is not observed 
in the testing case. Moreover, the DT-P accuracy is found to be highly correlated with the database 
coverage when DT-P is applied to a different testing case. As a result, it is suggested that advanced 
machine learning algorithms should be adopted, especially for prognosis, such that the complexity 
of networks is comparable to that in data. Meanwhile, since the implementation of DTs is highly 
affected by multiple sources of uncertainty, it is also suggested that a formalized DT development 
and assessment process should be developed. The objective is to implement DTs in a transparent, 
consistent, and improvable manner, where refinements on DTs can be made based on the previous 
development and assessment results. 
 
After the training and testing, the DTs are assembled to form the integral NAMAC system. This 
baseline NAMAC system is coupled with the GOTHIC plant simulator for its demonstration and 
assessment. Three sets of accident scenarios are designed, and a confusion matrix is created to 
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determine the misclassification ratios of NAMAC. It is found that within the training databases, 
NAMAC can make reasonable recommendations with zero FNR and FPR such that the peak fuel 
centerline temperature can also be maintained below the limit. However, when the scenario is 
beyond the training cases, the FNR and FPR increase, especially when the scenarios are more 
severe. Therefore, a discrepancy checker is suggested to detect unexpected reactor states and to 
alert operators for safety-minded actions. Moreover, control strategies in this NAMAC system are 
assessed and ranked based only on safety margins. The reliability or lifetime of primary sodium 
pumps, which adversely affect the pump performance, will be considered in the future.  
 
Abbreviation 
 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
DT Digital Twin 
DTE Digital Twin Environment 
DTP Digital Twin Prototype 
DTI Digital Twin Instance 
DT-D  Digital Twin for Diagnosis 
DT-P  Digital Twin for Prognosis 
DT-SA Digital Twin for Strategy Assessment 
DT-SI Digital Twin for Strategy Inventory 
EBR-II Experimental Breeder Reactor II 
FCL Fuel Centerline Temperature 
FDD Fault Detection and Diagnosis 
FHF Function-based Hierarchical Framework 
FN False Negative 
FNN Feed Forward Network 
FNR False Negative Rate 
FP False Positive 
FPR False Positive Rate 
HPP High-Pressure Plenum 
IHX Intermediate Heat Exchanger 
LOFA Loss of Flow Accident 
LPP Low-Pressure Plenum 
NAMAC Nearly Autonomous Management and Control 
NPP Nuclear Power plant 
PFCL Peak Fuel Centerline Temperature 
PSP Primary Sodium Pump 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
QoI Quantity of Interest 
RMSE Root Mean Square error 
SCS Supervisory Control System 
SSF Safety Significant Factor 
TN True Negative 
TNR True Negative Rate 
TP True Positive 
TPR True Positive Rate 
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UP Upper Plenum 
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Appendix A. Digital Twin Assessment Results 
 
This Appendix discusses detailed results from digital twin (DT) assessment with respect to each 
source of uncertainty.  
 
A.1. Coverage Assessment for Digital Twin for Diagnosis  
 
In this study, the coverage is firstly defined based on the characterization of accident scenarios and 
control procedures – e.g. end speeds or ramping-down speed for primary sodium pump (PSP) #1 
and #2, trip temperature for action injection – for the training and testing scenarios. To evaluate 
the impact of coverage, testing scenarios with different characterizations than the training 
scenarios are used to assess the performance of each DT. Table 9 shows a list of training and 
testing case studies with different coverage conditions according to the characterization for 
accident scenario. Based on the distribution of testing and training data points, the coverage 
condition can be further classified into two classes: interpolation and extrapolation. Interpolation 
is defined as the conditions where no new data point exist in the testing database or the new data 
points in the testing database is within the range of a discrete set of known data points in the 
training domain. The extrapolation is defined as the conditions where new data points in the testing 
database is outside the range of training data points. Eq. 8 defines the issue space for this case 
study encompasses a partial loss of flow in Primary Sodium Pump#1 (PSP1) and is fully 
represented by time-dependent curves of rotational speed, 𝑤1(𝑡). Again, 𝑤0 represents the nominal 
pump speed (in rad/s), 𝑇1 represents the ramping-down duration (in s) and (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑 represents the 
normalized pump #1 end speed. 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐 marks the time when the accident transient begins. By varying 
the pump end speed, (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑, and pump ramp down duration, 𝑇1, different profiles for pump ramp 
down can be achieved. 
Table 9: Comparisons of DT-D errors with different coverage conditions 
 𝑇1 (𝑤1)𝑒𝑛𝑑 Coverage condition 
DT-D 
Errors 
Training 1 21.02 51.6-100 Global Extrapolation as (ω2)end in testing 1 
is outside the range of training 1 
0.01 
Testing 1 21.02 3.2 43.3 
Training 2 50 9.7-58.1 Global Interpolation as (ω1)end in testing 2 is 
inside the range of training 2 
0.10 
Testing 2 50 38.7 0.08 
 
It is found that the DT-D performance depends heavily on the coverage conditions: when the 
characterization of testing scenarios locate outside the training scenarios, the DT-D error is grow 
larger than the training error; when the characterization of testing scenarios locate inside but not 
completely the same as the training scenarios, the DT-D errors are of similar order of accuracy to 
the training errors.  
 
In addition to the global characterization, the coverage is defined by the data distribution and 
further quantified as the mutual information between the probability distribution function (PDF) 
of training and testing data points. In this study, a database is selected from the whole data 
repository, and all data points are approximated by the kernel density estimation as in Eq. 12:  
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𝑃𝐷𝐹(𝑃𝑖) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐾𝐻(𝑥 − 𝑦𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 Eq. 12 
where 𝑥 represent the multi-dimensional random vectors with density function 𝑃𝑖; 𝑦𝑖 represents a 
random sample drawn from the database; 𝑛 represents the total number of data points in the 
selected database. Meanwhile, the mutual information is calculated with the symmetric Kullback-
Leibler divergence (K-L divergence) as in  
 
 
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑃, 𝐷) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑖) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃(𝑖)
𝐷(𝑖)
) + 𝐷(𝑖) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐷(𝑖)
𝑃(𝑖)
)
𝑖
 Eq. 13 
 
Figure 18 shows the PDF for different selections of database based on the episodes. Each episode 
has different control procedures characterized by the end of speed of PSP #2 (𝑤2)𝑒𝑛𝑑 and the trip 
temperature 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝, and there are in total 1024 episodes. 1:10:100 means that the database divides a 
total 100 episode uniformly into 10 parts, while the first episode is selected from each part and 
assembled as a database. It can be found that the distribution of first 100 episodes is very different 
from the distribution of 1024 episodes. Meanwhile, the number of divisions does not significantly 
influence the PDF distributions.  
 
Figure 18: PDF distributions for different selections of database 
 
Figure 19 plots the root mean squared error (RMSE), defined in Eq. 9, versus the quantified mutual 
information by symmetric K-L divergence. It is found that the DT-D testing errors are strongly 
correlated with the mutual-information between training and testing databases. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient (PCC) is calculated to determine the degree of linear correlation as in Eq. 
14 
 
 
𝜌𝐾𝐿,𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐾𝐿, 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸)
𝜎𝐾𝐿𝜎𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸
  Eq. 14 
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where 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐾𝐿, 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸) represents the covariance of K-L divergence and the testing RMSE; 𝜎𝐾𝐿 
and 𝜎𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸  represent the standard deviation of K-L divergence and testing RMSE respectively. The 
PCC value is found to be ~0.4, which again indicates a strong correlation.  
 
Figure 19: Diagnosis testing error with different coverages quantified by mutual information 
 
 
A.2. Training-Parameter Assessment for Digital Twin for Diagnosis 
 
In this study, the selection of the target loss is assessed for the digital twin for diagnosis (DT-D). 
The target loss is used as one of the stop criteria that stop neural network training when the training 
mean squared error is lower than the selected value. Figure 20 shows the plot of training and testing 
errors with different target MSE. The issue space characterization for the testing database is the 
same as those for the training database – i.e. testing database is covered and globally interpolated 
by the training database. It is found that the target loss is reached as most training errors equal the 
target loss, which indicates the target loss is triggered to stop the training. It is also found that when 
the target loss is smaller than 0.5, the testing errors are generally larger than the training error, 
which indicates an overfitting with limited generalization capability in interpolated cases. When 
the target loss is larger than or equal to 0.5, the testing and training errors are almost the same.  
 
 
Figure 20: Plot of training and testing errors given different target MSE for DT-D. The testing 
database is covered by the training database (globally interpolated condition) 
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In addition to the covered and globally interpolated case, this study also evaluates the impact of 
target loss on DT-D’s performance in globally extrapolated conditions. Databases from two 
extrapolated conditions are used: one with more severe primary pump malfunctions than the 
training case, while another one with lighter primary pump malfunctions than the training case. 
Meanwhile, an interpolated testing is performed with the same degree of pump malfunction as the 
training database. All three cases have the same control actions to mitigate the malfunctions. The 
red dashed line represents the acceptance criterion, where the RMSE is expected to be less than 
 30℃. It is found that the error of DT-D in the extrapolated conditions is generally larger than the 
error in the interpolated conditions. When the target loss is less than 0.5, the errors of testing in 
extrapolated conditions are larger than the acceptance criteria, which indicates a limited 
generalization capability and overfitting issue. When the target loss is larger than or equal to 0.5, 
the error of testing in extrapolated conditions become acceptable.  
 
Both tests with globally interpolated and extrapolated conditions indicate that the DT-D errors are 
strongly correlated with the target loss of machine-learning training. Sensitivity analysis and 
optimization techniques are needed to properly select training parameters.  
 
 
Figure 21: Plot of training and testing errors given different target MSE for DT-D. The testing 
database is not fully covered by the training database (globally extrapolated condition). The red 
dashed line represents the acceptance criterion for DT-D.  
 
A.3. Input-Variable Assessment for Digital Twin for Diagnosis 
 
To evaluate the impact of input variables on the error of DT-D, this study designs two case studies: 
one missing input due to single sensor failure, distribution of error given all inputs along each 
transient. The case with missing inputs is designed by replacing one out of three DT-D input by 
not-a-number (NaN) index. In most of the neural network toolbox, these missing values can either 
be replaced by the average of other valid number of the same input type, or they can be removed. 
Since DT-D is required to continuously infer the peak fuel centerline temperature, this study 
replaces all NaN value by the average of other valid number. Figure 22 shows the inputs for DT-
D with normal and failed sensor that measures the upper plenum sodium temperature.  
 
43 
 
 
Figure 22: Comparison of inputs DT-D with normal sensor and failed sensor for upper plenum 
temperature. The sensor failure starts from 5 sec.  
 
Figure 23 compares the DT-D output for the fuel centerline temperature 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿 given normal 
sensors and a single sensor failure. The real value from the database overlaps with the predictions 
by normal sensors. It is found that the DT-D responses differently to sensor failures at different 
locations. Diagnosis outputs are more sensitive to sensor readings at high-pressure plenum than 
others, and the prediction start to fluctuate drastically starting from 15sec, which is 10sec after 
sensor failures. For failures of other sensors, the prediction starts to fluctuate from 25sec, which is 
20 sec after the sensor failure, with abnormal sensors at low-pressure or abnormal upper plenum 
 
Figure 23: Comparison of predicted 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐿 given normal sensors and a single sensor failure 
 
As an average value, MSE cannot clearly indicate the distribution of errors along one transient. To 
better demonstrate how DT-D makes predictions along different episodes, this study evaluates the 
distribution of errors for all 1024 episodes, while each episode contains a 2000-step transient. Each 
step is 0.1sec, and the entire transient lasts for 200sec. Figure 24 shows the surface plot for DT-D 
predictions error, quantified by root mean squared error (RMSE), for all 1024 episodes. The 
maximum RMSE is found to be 6.7℃, which is acceptable comparing to the 30℃ criterion. 
44 
 
However, it is found that the prediction errors suddenly increase at 35sec and gradually decrease 
after then.  
 
 
Figure 24: Surface plot for DT-D prediction error, quantified by RMSE, for all 1024 episodes, 
while each episode contains a 200-step transient 
 
A.4. Coverage and Training-Parameter Assessment for Digital Twin for Prognosis 
 
Similar to the DT-D assessment, the impact of coverage is evaluated for the digital twin for 
prognosis (DT-P). Figure 25 compares the predicted outputs against real values for testing in 
extrapolated conditions. It is found that the DT-P cannot correctly predict the consequence factor 
in extrapolated conditions. Compared to the training results in Figure 10, the DT-P error is strongly 
affected by the coverage condition.  
 
 
Figure 25: Comparison of predicted outputs against real values from databases for DT-P testing. 
Dash lines are diagonal lines 
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At the same time, the impact of a training parameter – e.g. target training loss – on the DT-P error 
is evaluated. It is found that the target loss is reached after the training as most training errors equal 
the target loss, which indicates the target loss is triggered to stop the training. However, the DT-P 
error exceeds the acceptance criterion (30℃) for all selections of target loss. As a result, the 
training errors for DT-P is correlated with the target loss. However, in extrapolated conditions, the 
impact from the target loss is limited.  
 
 
Figure 26: Plot of training and testing errors given different target MSE for DT-P. The testing 
database is not fully covered by the training database (globally extrapolated condition). The red 
dashed line represents the acceptance criterion for DT-P. 
 
